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Abstract 
 
The strategic role of new product development and innovation (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1986; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Hamel & Prahalad, 1995; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998) makes design performance a central concern of managers. Project 
management therefore appears to be an adequate solution to the integration problems 
raised by these activities. Work such as that of Clark & Fujimoto (1991) has helped 
make heavyweight project management a dominant organizational model. In this article, 
we wish to question this tendency to equate projects and innovation. This tendency can, 
in fact, appear surprising inasmuch as Clark & Fujimoto (1991) indicate that their 
research does not take into account the question of advanced engineering or basic 
research. We therefore believe that it can lead to improper use of the project format to 
manage innovation. We feel that, in line with work on project classification 
(Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Shenhar & Dvir, 1996, Balanchandra & Friar, 1997), a 
distinction should be drawn between the various design situations to which different 
types of projects will be suited. Qualitative research conducted at a European 
automobile manufacturer on Telematics services will allow us to identify the 
management methods suited to the most innovative projects, i.e. those for which neither 
technologies nor customer requirements are known at the start of the project (referred to 
by Atkinson & al. 2006 as “soft” projects) We will show how these situations shake up 
traditional project management models and will propose five management principles 
adapted to this new situation.  
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Projects and Innovation : the ambiguity of the literature and its 
implications. 
 
The strategic role of new product development and innovation (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1986; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998) makes design performance a central concern of managers. Project 
management therefore appears to be an adequate solution to the integration problems 
raised by these activities. Work such as that of Clark & Fujimoto (1991) has helped 
make heavyweight project management a dominant organizational model1. Adler 
(1989), for example, makes the project the main way to implement innovations. This is 
a major characteristic of American managerial literature. Paradoxically, the leading US 
manuals (typically Burgelman et al., 2004) cover in detail the way in which the 
innovation process is carried out, technology analysis tools, the development of 
industry, etc., but offer little insight into the organization appropriate to innovation. 
Indeed, this topic is approached either via the resource-based model (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1994), from the perspective of functional policies or, when the question of integration is 
raised, via project management models. The article by Clark & Wheelwright (1992) 
on heavyweight project management is therefore the incontrovertible reference. 
In this article, we wish to question this tendency to equate projects and 
innovation. This tendency can, in fact, appear surprising inasmuch as Clark & Fujimoto 
(1991) indicate that their research does not take into account the question of advanced 
engineering or basic research (p. 26). We therefore believe that it can lead to improper 
use of the project format to manage innovation. We feel that, in line with work on 
project classification (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Shenhar & Dvir, 1996, 
Balanchandra & Friar, 1997), a distinction should be drawn between the various design 
situations to which different types of projects will be suited. 
Qualitative research (Eisenhardt, 1989) conducted at a European automobile 
manufacturer will allow us to identify the management methods suited to the most 
innovative projects, i.e. those for which neither technologies nor customer requirements 
are known at the start of the project (referred to by Atkinson & al. 2006 as “soft” 
projects). We will show how these situations shake up traditional project management 
models and will propose management principles adapted to this new situation.  
                                                          
1 Although Eisenhardt & Tabrizi (1995) demonstrated the need to alter it in contexts marked by a high 
degree of uncertainty. 
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1. Projects and innovation: an analysis of the literature 
1.1. The mutual ignorance between projects and innovation literatures 
The links between project management and innovation management literatures are 
complex and are marked by a relative mutual ignorance.  
On one hand, their is a tendency in the project management literature to equate 
project and innovative organization. Thus Cleland & Ireland (2002) recommend project 
management « to any ad hoc undertaking » (p. 69) and state that “the justification for 
project management arises from the need for new or improved  products, services or 
organizational processes” (ibid.). They then propose criteria for assessing the need to 
resort to a project and recommend its use for innovation situations. However, their 
reasoning stops there while the “newness” of the situation relates, as we will see, to very 
diverse situations. 
This tendency to equate projects and innovation has probably historical roots. 
Indeed, since its inception, project management has been associate with major 
innovations, specially in weapons systems design. Thus, in his seminal paper, Gaddis 
(1959) explains that project management is the best way to increase new product 
development efficiency in high-technology industries (electronics, defence, aeronautics, 
…). The Manhattan (Smyth, 1945 ; Groves, 1992 ; Rhodes, 1986), Polaris (Sapolski, 
1972) and Appolo (Brooks & al, 1979; Morris, 1997) Projects have thus come to 
symbolize the effectiveness of project to manage extremely complex and innovative 
ventures. 
 
On the other hand the literature on innovation management keeps up complex 
relations with projects. Organization by projects is rarely mentioned, even if this modes 
of management is frequently underliying.  Thus, the project format is typical of 
“organic” operation, although Burns & Stalker (1961) make no reference to it2. In the 
same line, Van de Ven & al. (1999) never mentions it, although the situations studied 
often correspond to a project-based organization. Moreover, the principles proposed in 
his 1986 paper (Self-organizing autonomous unit, redundant functions, requisite variety, 
temporal linkage) clearly correspond to project management. This format therefore 
                                                          
2 And for good reasons : Burns a Stalker are sociologist and, in 1961, project management is a rather 
fuzzy field. 
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seems, at first sight, to be the organizational model suited to innovation management. 
Furthermore this is emphasized by Mintzberg & McHugh (1985) when they equate 
project structure and adhocracy3, explaining this is the most suitable way to manage 
innovation in organizations.   
 
The link between projects and innovation is established by research on the key 
success factors of innovation to establish a link between projects and innovation. 
Maidique & Zirger (1990) plays here a pivotal role. they show that managerial 
excellence, defined explicitly as effective project management, is the main reason for 
successful innovations. Indeed they explain that  
« Products are more likely to be successfull if they are planned and implemented 
well. Project planning should include all phases of the development process : 
research development, engineering, manufacturing and market introduction. The 
functional groups should interact and coordinate activities during the 
development process. Particularly important are the links between R&D and the 
other functional groups, marketing and manufacturing. One critical reason for a 
strong link with marketing is to ensure the firm understands user needs and 
effectively translate these needs into solutions for customers. The connection 
with manufacturing is emphasized because of the increasing importance of 
efficient and effective product operations, a goal that cannot be reached unless 
design for manufacturing is part of the product’s development objectives.  » 
(1990, p. 879-880). 
But their analysis of project management practices stops here, and they quote Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1986) has examples of best practices in the management of innovative 
projects.  
1.2. The emergence of a dominant model 
The link between projects and innovation is thus brought to the fore by the study 
of Japanese firms which, in the 80’s, are increasingly successful on the US and 
European markets. The works from Imaï, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1985), Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1986), Clark, Chew & Fujimoto (1987) et Clark & Fujimoto (1991) enables 
to formalize a model of project management, referred here to as the Heavyweight 
Model,  that will be considered as a panacea to manage new product development. 
                                                          
3 « One important contemporary form is project structure or adhocracy”. (p. 160). 
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In our view, Product Development Performance (1991) constitutes a landmark 
contribution to the literature on product design and project management4. Clark and 
Fujimoto started with performance data that showed the superiority of Japanese firms. 
They went on to present a detailed comparative analysis of product development 
practices at automakers around the world. Their contribution is twofold. 
Conceptually, the authors regarded new product development as a set of 
information processing and problem solving activities5. The intermediate outputs of the 
process were information assets, in particular, product-specific knowledge and product 
and process designs. The aim of the overall process was to ensure the product’s 
integrity, i.e. its intrinsic qualities and its ability to meet the customer’s expectations. 
For a complex product like an automobile, the greatest management challenge was to 
establish organizational structures and practices that ensured adequate integration of 
diverse skills and knowledge, including the customers’ knowledge about what it was 
like to use the product (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, Chapter 2). This illustrates the 
structural convergence between the project mode of organizing and the challenge raised 
by innovation. Researches on innovation management thus underlines 
− The crucial role of integration of the expertise necessary to the success of 
innovation (e.g. Gaddis, 1959 ; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967 ; or more recently 
Iansiti & Clark, 1994), 
− The need for flexibility in order to adapt to the evolutions of the environment 
and the resulting feedbacks between the different phases of the process 
(Burns & Stalker, 1961 ; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986 ; Van de Ven, 1986). 
This helps us to understand the  attraction force of projects to manage innovations even 
if, as we will see, this a priori convergence may be dangerous.  
On the operational side, Product Development Performance brought into focus 
three important new management ideas: (1) heavyweight project managers; (2) 
overlapping problem-solving cycles (also called concurrent engineering); and (3) the 
integration of customers and suppliers into product development activities.  
Heavyweight project managers: “To the extent that product performance is more 
than just the sum of component performance or technical specifications,” Clark and 
                                                          
4 Indeed chapter 5 “Designing the car” of the best-seller The Machine that Changed the World  relies 
heavily on the work from Clark, Chew & Fujimoto (1987) 
5 This perspective opened new territories for research on new product development (see the surveys by 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995 and Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). For an overview of K. Clarks works see 
Lenfle & Baldwin (2007). 
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Fujimoto argued, “firms need to worry about integrity and thus integration” (p. 250). 
They defined two types of integration: (1) internal integration, which aimed to 
coordinate the various groups within a company; and (2) external integration, which 
aimed to coordinate the company with customers and suppliers. Clark and Fujimoto 
observed that, in their sample, the highest levels of external and internal integration 
were achieved (by Japanese firms) through having a “heavyweight product manager.” 
This manager was committed to the project through its entirety; was empowered to 
make key decisions; and had the status, experience and resources to exert influence on 
both team members and senior managers.6 At least in the auto industry, heavyweight 
project managers were a pre-requisite to success in product development.  
Overlapping Problem-Solving Cycles (Concurrent Engineering): Clark and 
Fujimoto identified and advocated practices that are now the hallmark of concurrent 
engineering, specifically: (1) overlapping the stages of the product development 
process; and (2) “high-bandwidth” and “bilateral” communication between those 
involved in each stage. The aim of overlapping stages was to anticipate downstream 
problems and fix them early, thus shortening development time. Clark and Fujimoto 
argued that this practice could be effective only if the upstream and downstream 
participants communicated in real time from the beginning of the process. This in turn 
meant that the work of project participants would change significantly. To justify the 
increased costs of concurrent engineering, Clark and Fujimoto developed constructs to 
measure the overlap, intensity and effectiveness of interdepartmental communication. 
They combined these metrics into a single “integrated problem-solving index.” They 
went on to show that Japanese firms generally had higher index scores, but, more 
importantly, that high scores were correlated with superior performance in terms of lead 
time, development productivity and product quality. 
Co-development: a new role for customers and suppliers: By the late 1980s it 
was well known that Japanese firms were less vertically integrated and relied more 
heavily on their suppliers than their western counterparts. Clark and Fujimoto’s 
contribution was to show how vertical relationships affected product development. In 
their view, the ideal state of “integration,” which gave rise to product “integrity,” did 
not stop at the boundaries of a firm, but extended backward to its suppliers and forward 
to  its customers as well. External integration by definition took place across a firm’s 
boundaries. The idea was to shorten overall development time and improve the quality 
                                                          
6 On the origin of this so-called “shusa” system at Toyota in the 1950s see Fujimoto, (1999, pp. 73-74). 
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of the product by involving customers and suppliers in the early stages of product 
design (Clark, 1989). These practices allowed mutual adaptation of product and process 
designs to take place, which in turn led to improvements in product functionality, cost, 
quality, and delivery time7.  
1.3. Toward a contingency theory of project management 
The work from Clark & Fujimoto seems very important because it  exert a strong 
influence over the project management pratices of european and US firms (see Midler, 
1993 ; Ellison & al. 1995 ; Fujimoto, 1999). It thus constitutes a model of « best 
practices » which rapidly becomes synonymous with efficiency in project and 
innovation management. This can, in fact, appear surprising inasmuch as Clark & 
Fujimoto (1991) indicate that their research does not take into account the question of 
advanced engineering or basic research (p. 26). Moreover in another book, Wheelwright 
& Clark (1992) emphasizes the need to distinguish between different types of project 
and to adapt the management methods and organization accordingly. This has been 
subsequently elaborated on by Shenhar & Dvir (1996 & 2004) and Shenhar (2001) 
among others, for technical projects. We believe, however, that the research of Shenhar  
has not fully taken into account the impact of innovation on project management 
methods. Thus, Shenhar & Dvir limit their approach to the technical and temporal 
aspects of innovation. They focus on the resources put in place to achieve an objective 
and not on the objective itself, which can also be uncertain. Following the work of 
Abernathy & Clark (1985) projects can therefore be classified based on their impact on 
the firm’s technical capabilities and on its “market” capabilities. In this perspective, 
“Development” refers to a situation were the technical and market knowledge 
associated with the project are well-known, whereas “Innovation” refers to a situation 
were both have to be explored. We therefore agree with contemporary thinking on the 
management of innovation, defined as a two-fold process of exploration of knowledge 
and concepts8 which then give rise to developments or research (Lenfle & Midler, 2003; 
Lenfle, 2004; Le Masson et al. 2006).  
                                                          
7 Clark and Fujimoto documented major differences, not only in the degree to which Japanese automaker 
were vertically separated, but also in the ways customers and suppliers participated in new product 
development. For example, U.S. firms used armslength contracts to manage suppliers and relied mostly 
on off-the-shelf parts for their new vehicles. In contrast, Japanese automakers brought their suppliers into 
the product development process and, as a result, had much higher percentages of newly designed parts in 
their new vehicles (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, p.151, Figures 6-8). 
8 We refer here to the C/K theory of design developed par Hatchuel & Weil (see 2003 for an 
introduction). 
Version du 28/09/2007 à 10:50 9
 
The question thus becomes what is the impact of this definition of innovation on 
project management ? The central issue is therefore whether the project format is suited 
to the management of innovation. Research conducted at a European automobile 
manufacturer on telematic services (Lenfle & Midler, 2003; Lenfle, 2005) shows, in 
fact, that innovation seriously disturbs the development model which, as we have 
shown, is dominant in the literature. This type of design situation shows five 
characteristics that are problematic for project management. Before analyzing this 
characteristics, we present our methodology.  
2. Research Design and data 
 
 To study these questions, in 2001 we made contact with one of the principal 
European car manufacturers, here identified as Telcar for reasons of confidentiality. 
After a presentation of our previous research on managing innovative projects (Lenfle & 
Midler, 2002), Telcar gave us permission to study the case of Telematic Services. 
Before describing our methodology for data collection in detail, we shall begin by 
providing an overview of this services.  
2.1. Research Site 
The New Information and Communication Technologies (NICTs) have for several 
years constituted a very fertile field for innovation with the proliferation of initiatives 
relating to telematics services for automobiles, or the “communicating car”. These terms 
refer to the motorist's ability to access, from the vehicle itself, a certain number of 
services, which are customarily grouped in four areas: 
1. Emergency breakdown service: a localized call for breakdown service in the 
event of a problem, the automatic triggering of SOS assistance in case of an 
accident, and remote maintenance; 
2. Navigational aids: navigation, plus guidance to amenities and points of interest 
(i.e. parking facilities, tourist attractions, hotels); 
3. Communication services: telephone, sending/receiving of e-mail, 
videoconferencing and the like; 
4. Entertainment or so-call “infotainment”: i.e. hotel reservations, online shopping, 
games for passengers, creation of a personal jukebox and so on. 
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Design and exploitation of such services involve various actors in complex cooperation 
processes. Service providers generate the information needed for the service (for 
example traffic information) and operate the service platform (for example the 
emergency call center) ; telecom operators develop and maintain the communication 
systems that connect the car to the service operators ; car equipment suppliers develop 
the onboard systems needed for the service (for example integrated radio, GPS and 
GSM equipment) ; car manufacturers specify, integrate and market the new services and 
onboard equipments. 
 
The first commercially available application, Onstar, was launched by GM in 1996, 
and other manufacturers quickly followed suit: BMW with Passo (1997) and then Assist 
(2000), Renault with Odysline (1999), Ford with Wingcast (2000), Fiat with Connect 
(2000), and Mercedes with Tele Aid (2001). The outlook today appears uncertain and 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the massive projections put forward in 2003 have never 
been realized9 and many OEM are experiencing great difficulties. Even the frontrunners 
count only several hundred subscribers (Fiat), while several projects were discontinued 
in 2001 (Renault's Odysline) or profoundly restructured (PSA Peugeot Citroen). On the 
other hand, GM – with its claim of 4 millions subscribers10 – is the only manufacturer 
that has achieved a certain degree of success as far as concrete results are concerned; at 
the other end of the scale, European manufacturers are experiencing great difficulties. 
And looking beyond the distribution of these innovations, the strategic and financial 
benefits of injecting massive investment into this field of innovation remain very 
uncertain for manufacturers. 
2.2. Data collection and analysis 
Data collection was performed over a three-year period. This enabled us to take 
part in the real-time design process and in the marketing of the first telematic service 
(emergency and breakdown call launched in February 2003)11. Consequently, we were 
able to follow and analyze the whole design process, and then observe its results. To do 
this, we received support from the Project Manager as well as from its main sponsors. 
As a result, we had virtually unlimited access in the field. The duration and frequency of 
                                                          
9 For example the Frost & Sullivan firm has evaluated the market for automotive telematics services at 
8.5 billion euros in 2007 and predicts a 15% growth rate beginning in 2003. 
10 Source : www.OnStar.com, Press Room, accessed june 25, 2007. See also Christensen & Roth (2002). 
11 See Lenfle & Midler, 2006. 
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the interaction with the design team enabled us to follow the development of the design 
process accurately and gain access to data sources usually closed to outsiders. More 
specifically we relied on three sources of evidence: 
1. About 70 semistructured interviews were conducted with 30 participants in the 
project. These interviews involved both technical infrastructure managers and the 
teams in charge of marketing and sales.  
2. We passively participated in all relevant meetings on the design of the Telematics 
services. In particular the monthly plenary meeting at which the progress of the 
project was discussed ;  
3. Written documents supplied by the company (reports, minutes of meetings, 
PowerPoint presentations, and so on), which enabled us to reconstruct the history of 
the project and its organization, to prepare for interviews and to obtain corroboration 
of interviewees’ statements; 
Following the paradigm of grounded research (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003) our analysis was built on detailed field notes – interview notes, 
transcripts of project meetings, company documents – compiled into detailed case 
studies for each phase of the design process. This process was iterative as the cases were 
frequently updated after follow-up discussions with respondents. More precisely each 
case study report was re-read by key informants and discussed during bi-annual research 
meetings involving the project manager and members of the project steering committee. 
These meetings simultaneously enabled the results presented to be confirmed and the 
directions taken by the research to be discussed. 
3. The impact of innovation on projects : the destabilization of 
development 
 
This research allows us to analyze the gap between development and innovation 
situation. This leads us to study the adaptation of project management to the latter. 
More precisely we have identified five characteristics of “innovative projects” that 
destabilize the “Development” model. 
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3.1. Emerging, strategically ambiguous projects (C1) 
In development projects, the strategy is formulated prior to the project’s 
implementation. In innovation projects, such prior definition of a strategy is difficult, 
simply because there is no shared understanding of the phenomena and causalities 
needed to formulate a strategy. What are, for example, the uses of “hydroforming” 
(Lenfle, 2001) ? What is a telematic service (Lenfle & Midler, 2003b)? How does one 
define an “autonomous flying vehicle” (Holmberg et al., 2003)? Here it is clear that it is 
impossible to first define the strategy and then begin the project. On the contrary, the 
project will make it possible to gradually define the strategy (Burgelman, 1983).  
This characteristic can be problematical, since it can be a source of confusion and 
misunderstanding over the objectives pursued by the various participants in the project. 
Two different strategic outlooks underlie current initiatives in the area of telematics 
services: 
− The first continues the innovation strategies that have been known to drive 
the automobile market for a decade (e.g. Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Midler, 
1996): the aim is to provide a distinguishing “value-added feature”. Service 
innovations, with their attendant technical equipment, are only an additional 
developmental stage, in the tradition of the airbag, ABS, the keyless car etc. 
− In the second strategic vision, the key element for manufacturers is the 
effectiveness of the commercial relationship between the company and its 
customer (which can be measured by customer loyalty rates, marketing costs 
and so on), an area that up until now has been relatively untouched by the 
waves of rationalization undergone by the automotive industry. In fact, it has 
been shown (Winer, 2001) that the automotive sector is one of the segments 
in which it is very difficult to set up a lasting customer relationship, due, first 
of all, to the infrequent nature of transactions (one buys a car only rarely) 
and, secondly, to the presence of an intermediary that acts as the interface 
between the customer and the manufacturer. In this context, the 
communicating car becomes a means of establishing a richer and more 
continuous relationship with customers by offering them services that set up 
a direct relationship with them beyond the act of purchasing the vehicle. 
In principle these two strategic outlooks appear very similar and entirely compatible : 
the car manufacturer can launch an innovative equipment that simultaneously support 
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new services used to improve his CRM strategy. But in fact, the two strategies implies 
different priorities for the project teams : 
- Thus, the speed with which the conspicuous onboard equipment in a car can 
be put on the market is a key point for the first viewpoint while, in the 
second outlook, redefining the customer-brand relationship is emphasized, 
which presupposes the setting up of an entire infrastructure for the use of the 
information within a CRM context. 
- Similarly, there are differing economic equations associated with the two 
strategies: the first strategy is based on a traditional economic argument, 
given the context of selling innovative equipment; in the second viewpoint, 
the economic repercussions are more indirect, but also more lasting (i.e. 
increased return on selling costs or improved customer loyalty). 
The story of the Telematic project show that the blocks and changes leads the team to 
study different scenarios which helps to progressively define the strategic goals 
pursued.  
3.2. A proactive approach (C2) 
The second difficulty lies in the fact that there is no explicit demand on the part of 
customers, and therefore no clearly identified market. This raises two problems. The 
first one refers to the legitimacy of the project in the organization. As shown for 
example by Dougherty & Hardy (1996) or Christensen (1997) innovative projects 
frequently suffer from their inability to secure the needed resources because of their 
illegitimacy regarding the dominant logic of the firm. Secondly this raise the question of 
the target audience (Who are the customers? What do they want?) 
The problems currently being encountered can be summed up by two major 
difficulties: 
− Defining the innovative service – The list of possible services is potentially 
quite large, ranging from traditional roadside assistance to hotel reservations, 
traffic information and e-mail services. The concrete implementation of 
these services offers the opportunity for a variety of solutions, between 
which it is difficult to choose. This is complicated by the fact that Telematics 
Services are completely new both to the public and the company.  
− Assigning a value to the innovative service – This is primarily a problem that 
stems from the fact that customers “do not know what they are buying” and, 
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with the exception of a few technology buffs, they are not willing to pay 
extra for it. But the problem also stems from the fact that the economic 
models for these services are new for the automobile industry: subscriptions, 
pay-per use, the involvement of third-party financing and so on. There is a 
great deal of uncertainty surrounding the costs associated with these services 
since they involve lasting commitments to processes that depend on a high 
level of customer initiative, which cannot be easily controlled. This can 
result in situations that might appear paradoxical, where certain services are 
launched for their image value alone with the hope that they don't “take off”, 
because a deficit would result from their full deployment. 
3.3. The difficulty in specifying the result of the projects (C3) 
This absence of clearly identified customers challenge one of the basics of 
project management : the existence of a clearly defined objective. Moreover, divergence 
can be conceived as a structural characteristics of innovation (Van de Ven, 1989 & 
1999). Therefore the result of the project therefore becomes difficult to define and the 
revenue indicator only very partially reflects the issues related to the project’s progress. 
Specifically, the goal cannot only be to develop a product whose characteristics are 
relatively clearly defined beforehand. Launching a service is not an end in itself for this 
kind of project. Rather, the goal should be to develop concepts and to creates 
knowledge that can be quickly applied to the design of other applications. Without this 
perspective, the investments required would not be profitable. As a result the total sales 
figure gives only a very incomplete picture of the project’s achievements. This raise an 
important question. Indeed, it is well known that clear perception of the potential gain 
from projects, undertaken with a view to actual production of the product at a given date 
and with given resources, is a powerful motor for energizing development projects. 
However, management of innovative projects cannot count on this mechanism due to 
the relatively abstract and diffuse character of the results and the stakes involved. 
Nevertheless recent advances in the theory of design helps us to clarify the “results” 
of this kind of projects. Following here Le Masson, Weil & Hatchuel (2006), we can 
identify Four different results for this projects : 
1. Concepts that, after development, becomes commercial products 
2. Concepts that have been explored but adjourned due to lack of time or resources 
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3. New knowledge that has been used during the exploration and can be re-used on 
other products (e.g. components, technical solutions, new uses, and so on) 
4. New knowledge that has not been used during the exploration but can be useful for 
other products. 
More than an absence of clearly defined objective, we shall therefore talk about a new 
type of objective12. 
3.4. Exploration of new knowledge (C4) 
Innovation projects make use of a technical innovation, a new practice, a new 
business model, etc. which, by definition, are not stabilized. As a result, the team will 
need to explore and develop new knowledge, which adds great uncertainty to the 
process. This high level of uncertainty has two consequences:  
 First, there is a much lower probability that such innovation will ultimately find 
their way to the market. This explains the culture of caution that has taken root in this 
situation. Given the lower likelihood of success, firms hesitate before undertaking more 
extensive research, which, if unsuccessful, will be a lost investment. This culture makes 
it difficult to implement the principle of anticipation so important in modern project 
management. This has all too familiar consequences, such as projects that spiral on and 
on; although they do not immediately use many resources, no-one knows whether they 
will eventually produce any results. Just how far is the principle of anticipation 
applicable, and how is it possible to break this vicious circle in which the likelihood of 
success remains low because no-one dares to anticipate? 
 Second, Unlike development projects where the result is the attainment of an 
objective, the knowledge management dimension is therefore ever-present and entails 
exploring an the  innovation field as quickly and as effectively as possible. In this 
context, the marketing of a product/service must be viewed as a clue to the 
identification of the initially unknown innovation field. The effectiveness of 
                                                          
12 We can actually wonder if the existence of a clearly defined objective is not overemphasized by the 
literature on project management. Consider the extreme case of the Manhattan Project that lead to the 
Atomic Bomb. At first sight the goal is clearly defined : build an atomic bomb (and this is identified by 
General Groves, the project manager, as a key success factor; Groves, 1962, p. 414). But in fact reports 
on the Manhattan Project (e.g. Smyth, 1945; Groves, 1962 ; Rhodes, 1986) showed the extraordinary 
uncertainties the project has to manage throughout its duration. Neither the technology (product and 
process) nor the “concept” where actually clearly defined (see the reactions to the Trinity Test on july 16, 
1945 in Rhodes, 1986) and the team manage simultaneously the most fundamental research and product 
and process engineering. What seems to us important is thus less the “clarity” of the objective than the 
fact that the team was entirely dedicated to the venture.  
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management is therefore equivalent to the effectiveness of a learning/knowledge 
creation process, which is a step beyond development.  
This uncertainty change radically the unfolding of the design process. Indeed, 
Project management for products has been structured in such a way as to uncouple the 
elimination of major uncertainties (i.e. the role of advanced engineering) from 
Development. Our prior comments make it clear that this uncoupling is particularly 
problematical in the development of telematics services, where it would seem, on the 
contrary, that product development and the establishment of an upstream knowledge 
base cannot be separated. Indeed when dealing with innovative applications, the 
marketing of new products or services is a prerequisite to the creation of expertise, 
which must be based on the way these services are received and accepted by customers. 
Moreover, with the uncontrollable proliferation of technology providers, 
experimentation is unavoidable, even at the risk of a high probability of failure. It then 
becomes necessary to make the best of such failures by capitalizing effectively on the 
lessons they provide. 
3.5. A specific temporality: hidden urgency and a multiplicity of time 
horizons (C5) 
The development of a new product within the framework of development projects is 
a process driven by milestones and limited by commercial necessity. In the 90’s the 
implementation of heavyweight project management has played a crucial role to make 
time-to-market the central rhythm of the firm and its suppliers (Midler, 1993 ; Fujimoto, 
1999). Urgency is built-in and is a powerful tool for motivating those involved (Gersick, 
1988; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). For an innovation project, the situation is 
characterized by the concept of “hidden urgency”. The innovation developed must be 
integrated into the development projects. However, the window of opportunity for 
achieving this is very narrow (one year during advanced development in the auto case, 
see Lenfle, 2001). Moreover, the team cannot limit its horizon to a single project. The 
fact that the various processes overlap therefore makes the deadlines difficult to discern. 
One will need to decide which project to focus on in the short term in order to introduce 
the first version of the products/services developed, while at the same time being 
mindful of the other aspects that need to be explored, an exploration that relates to 
subsequent projects and/or research initiatives. 
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4. How to manage innovative projects ? The Telematic Platform 
as a prototype organization. 
 
What kind of organization would be capable of driving the exploration of such an 
innovative field ? The Heawyweight Model would appear to be ineffective, since it is no 
longer possible to specify in advance either the objectives to be attained or the course 
the project should take. Some recent researches suggests guidelines for more 
appropriate tools.  
- The “lineages” concept (Chapek, 1997 ; Le Masson, 2001) emphasize the 
dynamic structuring of repeated product innovation strategies and of learning 
curves regarding technical and functional concepts and fields of knowledge, but 
leave wide open the question of how these should be transformed into 
organizational and interfirm cooperation tools.  
- The “experiential model” of product development formalized by Eisenhardt & 
Tabrizi (1995) is based on the analyze of product development pratices in the 
highly-dynamic computer industry. It underlines the role of intensive 
experimentation, rapid iterations, frequent milestones and powerful project 
leaders. 
- “Innovative project management” was defined and tested in our  previous 
research (Lenfle, 2001) to fill this gap. We formalized generic principles to 
manage this highly risky projects (ibid.), and the Telcar Research, gives us the 
opportunity to test the relevance of these generic principles. We used it to 
analyze the organizatioin set up by Telcar to manage an ambitious innovation-
based strategy in the field of telematics.  
 
In this part, we shall detail the results of this analysis, which focuses on one specific 
case, the telematics platform (TP). After presenting this organization, we will show that 
the management of such projects implies the development of specific management 
principles.  
4.1. The Telematic Platform 
Between 1998 and 2004, TelCar decided to set up a dedicated structure to organize 
the development and marketing of telematics services. The TP has brought together, in 
the same location, a team of approximately twenty people representing different 
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department of the firm (marketing, IT, electronics, purchasing, product line 
management, services etc.). The TP has its own budget and operates under a single 
manager. This platform has a multi-faceted mission:  
- it is charged with maintaining a technology watch over Telematics,  
- it is responsible for defining specifications for future telematics hardware and 
services, anticipating problems concerning the building of equipment into 
vehicles, and even identifying suppliers that are likely to participate in this field.  
- Finally, it must coordinate initial implementation of the first services.  
In the following sections, we describe and we analyze the running of the TP in the light 
of our theoretical framework. Indeed we have identified five principles that summarized 
the functioning of the TP and provides the basis of a project management model 
adapted to innovation.  
4.2. Management principles 
4.2.1. Develop a specific evaluation reference 
The first difficulty faced by innovation projects is that of legitimacy. Given their 
nature, one of the major risks is to view them as a multitude of studies conducted 
independently by various entities of the organization (business lines, projects, 
hierarchies) and/or of its partners, and not to regard them as a coherent unit with 
significant implications. Our first principle therefore affirms the need to develop a 
specific evaluation reference. Formalization of an innovation project therefore results 
in an indivisible group of studies that concern a technique and its applications being 
accepted as a unit of action in order to gradually create overall competence in the field 
(uses, technical solution, partners, etc.). The difficulty then is to manage this portfolio, 
in which each study is carried out not only for its own sake but also for its contribution 
to the whole. 
The setting up of the TP conforms to this vision. The existence of this 
organization within TelCar provided the conditions for an innovative exploration in a 
field that essentially cuts across all boundaries – those of projects, skills, products, time 
constraints, and functional departments. It takes into account the interdependence of the 
various dimensions of the Telematics services.  However, at the same time as it plays 
out its commando role in an emerging field, this type of set-up must work with existing 
entities, which will subsequently use and build upon what has been learned. The TP was 
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in a position to cooperate with other parts of the company, which leads us to look at the 
various existing means of cooperation with other parts of the organization (technical 
departments, commercial structures, and so on). In the TP's case, there was an "outer 
circle" made up of representatives of technical departments and product lines. Members 
of this group were heavily involved in the subject while still remaining attached to their 
original departments: they were often at the platform and participates to the “Telematic 
plenary”, the monthly meeting organized by the TP manager to check-up the course of 
the project. Also included were management structures set up by the manufacturer to 
handle all questions connected with telematics. These structures usually draw in 
participants from a more senior level in the hierarchy, although for the most part on a 
strictly part-time basis. The members of the "outer circle" have a dual role, which is 
essential since they constitute a key link in the "attachment" of the platform to the 
company. On the one hand, they are the representatives of the product lines and the 
technical departments within the platform. Wearing this hat, they complement the skills 
brought together in the inner circle by supplying the expertise of their own departments. 
Their contribution also includes clarifying the policies and constraints that must be built 
into the platform for its actions to be acceptable to the rest of the company. On the other 
hand, they are the representatives and channels of communication from the platform to 
the technical departments and product lines, and thus participate in disseminating the 
TP's activities within their own spheres13. 
While it clearly illustrates the first principle of a unifying organizational identity 
focused on a single concept, our analysis of the TP also reveals how difficult it is to 
preserve a balance between focusing on the emerging concept and maintaining 
cooperation among the various elements present. Our research in fact showed that:  
− As far as bringing together the various initiatives was concerned, the TP 
could hardly be said to have drawn in certain strands initiated prior to its 
creation; 
− As far as the involvement of key skills was concerned, the fields of services 
and distribution were underrepresented compared with technical skills. 
4.2.2. The central role of experimentation and concurrent exploration 
The uncertainty inherent in these projects constitutes the second difficulty faced by 
the team. The traditional methods of project management are in part ineffective: no 
                                                          
13 A classical “core team members responsibility” (Clark & Wheelwright, 1992).  
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project schedule, difficult task breakdown, constantly changing objectives, etc. This 
then raises two questions: 
− What to do in this type of situation where everything is uncertain and where 
it is difficult, and even impossible, to anticipate problems based on past 
experience? 
− Where to begin? Is it necessary to explore phenomena and functionalities 
separately or at the same time? 
 
On the first point, studies on innovation and design management (Van de Ven, 
1989 & 1999; Lynn et al., 1996; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Thomke, 2003) underscore 
the need for action (Bias for action) in the absence of clear preferences, which will 
allow problems and solutions to be discovered. Our second principle therefore 
emphasizes the central role of tests (prototypes, testing, customer trials, etc.) in the 
management process14.  
Sketching out a plan of action must therefore be seen as a temporary grid over 
the field to be explored, allowing the learning process to begin. In this context, the 
design of the experiments that will prove or disprove the initial hypotheses occupies a 
crucial place in the management of the project. This is a key coordination element, 
inasmuch as no other timescale is applicable, unlike with development projects. In 
addition, it is a way of creating knowledge (and surprises!) that could radically change 
the direction of the investigation, whereas in development projects the main purpose of 
testing is to confirm the validity of the proposed solutions. The intensity of the learning 
experience will depend on the ability of the team to generate, carry out, and learn from a 
continuous flow of tests over a period of time (Van de Van & al. 1999; Iansiti, 1998; 
Thomke, 2003).  And, indeed, the history of the TP is littered with such experiments, 
which, while using relatively modest means, enable testing of the projected services 
(prototypes on test rigs, experimentation using simplified versions of the services to be 
provided based on temporary agreements with various partners etc.). 
 
The second point relates to the way in which these projects are carried out. In an 
extremely dynamic context, separating technical and market explorations increases the 
                                                          
14 In this respect, we agree with the “experiential” model proposed by Eisenhardt & Tabrizi (1995), which 
stresses the importance of the frequency of tests and milestones to coordinate design activities in a 
situation of great uncertainty. 
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risk that an answer that is relevant at a given time is no longer relevant when the other 
dimensions of the problem have been resolved; consequently, the project is constantly 
drifting.. The third principle therefore emphasizes the need for concurrent 
exploration, which must concern both concepts and knowledge. This being the case, 
whether the project comes to fruition or not depends on the speed of the investigation 
and on the synchronization of a solution in the area of marketing and technology. In 
accordance with this principle, an investigation strategy where all the studies are 
scheduled to run in parallel would be of much greater value than an investigation where 
they are scheduled consecutively. This corresponds to the idea of concurrent 
engineering; however, the objective is not so much the speed of the market launch as the 
increased likelihood of success. There is therefore a shift from concurrent engineering 
to concurrent exploration (Gastaldi & Midler, 2005). 
That is why the TP's mission covers everything from exploring the field to lauching 
new services. It is in fact now well established that the validation of the first ideas to be 
developed plays an essential role in the design of innovative solutions [3] & [5]. In any 
case, the role of the platform will evolve from phase to phase : 
• The platform assumes the leadership role in the initial stages, which consist of: 
- Exploring the field of innovation "defined" by the driving concept of a 
"telematics service" (What services are possible? What technical lines of attack 
can be envisaged?); 
- Sorting out which of these strands fit in best with the company's overall strategy. 
Here, the role of the tool is to prepare and organize the decision-making 
paradigm of the sorting process, which should be confirmed by company 
management representatives (technical, production and marketing departments 
etc.); 
- Preparing the solution (once the concepts have been defined), by designing 
“halfway solutions” [10] that correspond to potential applications and have been 
through a validation process proving them suitable to be put forward as a 
credible proposal to the project teams. 
• The leadership role then passes to the technical groups and project teams for the 
final development stage, although the platform continues to monitor the 
implementation in order to prepare future services. This is in fact the time when 
problems with implementing the concept are discovered, factors that will enable 
subsequent versions to be improved. 
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The major difficulty here is to strike a balance between these two roles. Two kinds 
of drift are in fact possible:  
• The first is a drift towards pure "research". In this case, the platform comes to be 
seen as a technology-watch tool, relatively isolated from the development stage. 
However contact with the practical side is crucial for the improvement of successive 
generations of applications. The platform's own experience has shown how difficult 
it is to draw in the technical people if the solutions that have been developed are not 
sufficiently "mature" or "tried and tested". 
• Conversely, the project can veer towards the development side by taking over the 
whole process of perfecting both services and equipment instead of leaving this to 
the traditional development projects. This problem was clearly observed on the TP, 
which, having noticed how technical uncertainties had plagued the vehicle project 
teams, took over the development of onboard hardware intended to handle future 
telematics services. The extent and difficulty of this development task rapidly 
shifted the centre of gravity of the TP's activities from a “federating pre-project 
phase” position in the field of telematics services to the position of developing an 
individual product. 
4.2.3. The dual nature of performance & reformulation of the goals along 
the way 
The last difficulty relates to management of this type of project, given that it is 
not possible to organize the convergence toward a pre-defined objective. One must 
therefore assume that each test associates a knowledge production process with a 
revenue creation process. Our fourth principle states that the management process 
must take into account these two different dimensions of performance: the value of 
the products and accumulated knowledge. This two-tiered dimension of project 
performance is very present in Clark’s work (particularly Iansiti & Clark, 1994). 
However, it is still treated as a by-product of development. Use of this knowledge is a 
matter that is often left to the project’s audit team (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992, chap. 
11). We feel, however, that this issue is at the heart of innovation project management, 
while the project is being carried out. It is one of the advantages of defining the project 
as a reference unit, where the team is explicitly responsible for this knowledge 
management among the various experiments and horizons it manages. It will then 
facilitate the creation of “learning income” (Le Masson et al., 2006). 
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A management tool must therefore take these two aspects of performance into 
account (see rows and columns of Fig. 1). A study can therefore progress to the 
marketing stage without providing any new knowledge apart from the fact that there is 
an immediate market for the component in question. Conversely, another study might 
not go on to produce any revenue but may nonetheless generate crucial knowledge for 
understanding the technique or for defining its potential field of application. This kind 
of management is essential in emerging technology, where the risk of failure is great 
because of the one-off nature of the strategy. The way the TP is defined accords with 
this philosophy of integrating a diversity of experiments in the strategy of investigating 
the field comprehensively. This strategy will enable progressive specification of the 
objectives to be reached (see rows and columns of the following diagram). 
 
Figure 1: The dual nature of the performance of studies in the portfolio of an innovative project 
 
Studies Customer's sector Service 
definition 
Technical 
options 
Etc. Outcome 
Study 1     
Study 2     
…     
Study n     
Result of 
studies 
Outcome Knowledge drawn from studies that can be used elsewhere  
 
Similarly, the management tools used must allow a reformulation of the 
objectives along the way (fifth principle). Projects will then be very heuristic, in which 
one can explore the space of potential targets and answers simultaneously, in search of 
satisfactory concept/knowledge combinations. The focus here is on gradually 
structuring the area explored. Performance is therefore judged according to the 
increasing return of the iterations ( Lenfle, 2001 ; Lenfle & Midler, 2002). To start 
with, investigations are guided by a set of requirements that may be the evaluation of a 
specific technology or, on the other hand, the fulfilment of a potential customer's need. 
The process of seeking an answer will generate knowledge that may well call into 
question the relevance of the original question or requirements. An investigation is not a 
simple tracing of the route from a single question to a single answer; it is the 
exploration of a matched question-and-answer pair, which may change as time goes on. 
The knowledge accumulated at time T makes it possible to better define the objectives 
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and constraints for period T+1: the technical areas to be explored are clarified, certain 
functionalities are excluded while others emerge, the right partners are identified, and so 
on. Thus, bit-by-bit, the investigations converge, or stop if the technique proves to be 
less useful than was previously thought. 
An illustration of this situation is provided by the history of telematics within 
TelCar. The strategy of the company in this area became progressively clearer between 
the two underlying visions that we identified in the first part. The slump in the value of 
dot-com companies also had a profound effect on the hypotheses and the conditions that 
had enabled the first operational steps to be taken. This Telcar has progressively 
abandoned “infotainment services” to re-focus on “Automotive telematics” (emergency 
and breakdown call, traffic information, navigational aids, …). 
5. Conclusion  
 
Our analysis shows that the a priori convergence between projects and innovation 
can be misleading. Following the growing body of research on the contingency theory 
of project management (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Shenhar, 2001; Shenhar & Dvir, 
2004), we emphasize the need to distinguish different situations and, accordingly 
different way of managing project. Specifically we demonstrate that organizations that 
have performed well in the efficient development of innovative products are ill 
equipped to grasp the opportunities in fields where both technical solutions and uses are 
highly uncertain.  
The Telematics Platform tried out at TelCar constitutes an organizational prototype, 
which broadly confirms the theoretical model of the project management of “innovative 
project” that we have described in another context (Lenfle, 2001). It illustrates the need 
to set-up a dedicated structure to manage the exploration of a “field of innovation” (Le 
Masson, 2001) that cut across traditional firm boundaries (department, project, time 
constraints…). But, at the same time, our research reveals some weaknesses. Firstly we 
explain the difficulty to involve the different departments concerned by the innovation 
(especially the sales networks, see Lenfle & Midler, 2006) or to take in projects initiated 
before the creation of the TP.  Secondly, we show that the TP drift toward pure 
development, partly because of problems with a supplier and partly because of the 
reluctance of project teams to support highly uncertain developments. Finally we 
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propose five principles that form the outline of a project management model suited to 
the most complex innovation situations. They help  
− define the nature of the desired objective (product and knowledge, gradual 
structuring of the innovation field).  
− discuss the nature of organizational settings suited to these situations.  
We therefore hope to contribute to the development of less tangible, but more generic 
management processes associated with highly uncertain environments, thus extending 
the scope of project management (Atkinson & al. 2006). 
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